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February 17, 2010 in Media, movies by The China Beat | 4 comments

This essay is based on the script of a talk Ying Zhu gave at Google’s New York offices on February 12,
2010. Sections in bold were not part of the original talk, but have been added by the authors to tease
out some of the issues that were left without further elaboration due to time constraints.
By Ying Zhu and Bruce Robinson
Editor’s note: This piece originally ran with Ying Zhu listed as its sole author. After it appeared, Ying
Zhu informed us that it should be described as a co-authored commentary, in recognition of the
extraordinary contribution to it by Bruce Robinson, with whom she had collaborated closely on a
related project; we have followed her wishes; and both Ying Zhu and China Beat ask that in further
attributions or discussion both authors be equally credited for this work.
I have recently been reading new books about China with titles like What Does China Think? and How
China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Reform and What This Means for the Future —
good books that give us genuinely valuable insight into the thinking of many of China’s leading
political and intellectual lights. But what they make me think is that we may not be thinking enough
about what Chinese society thinks, so I would like to take the opportunity to discuss the concept of
China’s emerging “critical masses,” and the power that the critical masses have in shaping the future
of China.
I would like to propose that the Chinese people are more and more the masters of their own destiny,
and maybe yours. As you know, sometime in 2008 China surpassed the U.S. as the country with the
largest number of Internet users. That’s the same year that it became the world’s largest greenhouse
gas emitter. It is also the United States’ leading creditor, owning, by most accounts, over 1 trillion
dollars of U.S. debt, and it will soon pass Japan as the world’s second largest economy. So as
Americans, as citizens of the world, and especially as Googlers, you all have something riding on
China’s choices now and in the future, even without the current controversy. And speaking of that
controversy, naturally, I should factor Google’s recent adventures in China into the overall scheme of
my take on Chinese media and society.
I want to say first that I am thrilled to be here at the reigning search engine of “Life, the Universe and
Everything.” Thrilled, but I might also say “in thrall,” since in my line of work it has become nearly
impossible to operate without constant resort to the little magic box that transforms keywords into the
raw material of articles and books. Maybe you could get it to do the writing too, in addition todating?
Once, of course, there was no Google. Back in the days before Google, say 30 years or so “BG,”
communications scholars used to give too little credit to audiences, who they regarded as mostly
passive recipients of messages contained in a one way flow of mass mediated communication.
We are repeating the same pattern today in paying too much attention to China’s leaders and
intellectuals, and to the surface content of media messages, without considering how Chinese
audiences use and interpret media and produce their own mediated information. We also tend to
emphasize government control and censorship of the media and the Internet, citing the “Great
Firewall of China” without considering either the real extent of information available, or what people
do with it. We are not alone in this. The Chinese state may also be giving audiences too little credit,
persisting in a deep-rooted conviction that national unity and political stability can only be maintained
through paternalistic management of culture and information.
What emerges in China is a commercialized and vastly expanding information society. We’ve heard
about censorship and crackdowns; but as you know much better than I do, people who want to DO
find means to bypass the Great Firewall. Vigorous public discussion and networking on the Internet
and via social media have become central features of contemporary Chinese society. So, for the fans
ofThe X-Files, I don’t know about the “truth,” but the information is out there, even in China. And

people do process information on their own terms, incorporating a variety of resources, which leads to
the “Critical Masses” concept.
Mao began his revolution with rhetorical paeans to the masses. The masses of Mao’s time, however,
were mostly shut off from the outside world, and were entirely at the mercy of a hyper-authoritarian
state. That reality has been utterly annihilated in post-Mao China by the twin detonation of colossal
economic development and globalization. China’s masses are now better off, better educated and
much more aware of and sophisticated about their own world and the world outside China. No longer
isolated, nameless masses, they are critical masses in these three related senses: “critical” to the
tenure of a one-party state that is no longer in a position to easily put down a popular rebellion;
“critical” in the sense that they identify problems and demand, and indeed influence state action; and
“critical” in the sense that they constitute ready networks of audience members and information
consumers with the potential to be moved to collective action by a catalyzing event or issue that
transforms passive association into active participation in groups of like-minded citizens expressing
their passion in forums ranging from online debates to street-level demonstrations or even extended
political or cultural campaigns.
Originally a scientific term, critical mass doesn’t mean “mass” in the sense of huge
numbers. The “critical” prefix is a qualifier. It means “just enough to achieve some certain
effect in some particular situation.” So not masses in the Maoist sense of revolutionary
masses. In fact, the effect of China’s development and mediatization is that China’s
“masses” have been extensively de-massified into a much more pluralistic society of people
divided along socio-economic lines into smaller interest groups. Local interest group actions
constitute the bulk of China’s recent critical mass activities such as the taxi driver strikes
and localized and short-term protests about job losses and property confiscations.
A recent article in The Guardian reports that rebellious Chinese netizens have built imitation websites
of both Google and YouTube as a protest against the state’s regulatory censorship of Google. As
reported in this article, YouTubecn.com offers videos from the real YouTube, which is blocked in China.
The Google imitation is called Goojje and includes a plea for Google not to leave China. The separate
projects went up within a day of each other in mid-January, just after Google’s threat to leave China.
The issue of copyright infringement aside, the sites enable access to sensitive topics in tightly
controlled China. Videos on social unrest in China can be found on the YouTube imitator, which is in
English. Quoted in theGuardian article, the founder of the YouTube knockoff, Li Senhe, told
the Christian Science Monitor “I did this as a public service.” It was reported that some Chinese
quickly welcomed the fake YouTube site but doubted that it would last long. Regardless, the
appearance of the sites is a typical instance of creative and public questioning on the Internet.
Writing for Financial Times, James Kynge describes “the last crazy days of Google.cn,” as Chinese
netizens, in anticipation of an expected crackdown, have gone “crazy” surfing the Google China site
because it has allowed, for the first time, uncensored searches in Chinese. “I’ve been doing all sorts of
crazy searches, really distracting myself from my work,” one netizen as quoted by saying, “I’ve done
Tiananmen Square, the love affairs of national leaders, the corruption of leaders’ children.
Everything.” No doubt the surreptitious joys of this user are shared by many like-minded “netizens.”
However, the most recent information I gathered from China is that some of these links are leading
nowhere, as they are obviously blocked by the Chinese censors.
A similar case is the odd fortune of James Cameron’s sci-fi eco-fable, Avatar. The film quickly won the
hearts and minds of audiences in China, who rose to Hollywood’s defense when the state abruptly
removed Avatar from 2-D screening rooms to make way for the domestic New Years
blockbuster, Confucius. This has resulted in a popular anti-Confucius outcry, which is about to
push Confucius, a “main-melody” film, off China’s screens. I should explain that a “main melody” film
or television program is anything that fits the state’s recommended thematic and ideological line. [1]
As China Daily reports, the wave of anti-Confucius sentiment following the removal of Avatar from 2-D
is a backlash against official maneuvering. The backlash has unintended consequences— “Amidst the
outpouring of anger and frustration toward movie industry manipulations are the voices that point to
the thoughts of Confucius as a negative force in Chinese history. The anti-Confucius sentiment runs

counter to the State’s trend of promoting Confucius and his teachings as a quintessentially Chinese
alternative.” “Just a year ago this situation was unimaginable. Then, you said one bad word about
Confucius and you risked a “flame war” that would incinerate you.” [2] The article then comments,
facetiously, that “What serious scholars could never [succeed] in demystifying, and whom former
chairman Mao Zedong, Lu Xun and all the revolutionaries failed to topple from the pedestal, the film
authorities did with one simple stroke — by throwing a boomerang at Pandora…and instead hitting the
man they had crowned with a halo.”
The China Daily piece goes on to say that “The same is true of managing controversial online content.
While most people have no qualms [about] shielding minors from unhealthy websites, they are
uncomfortable with an all-encompassing monitoring system such as Green Dam. The filtering of
bawdy jokes on the mobile platform is also backfiring, [turning] erstwhile sympathizers of censorship
into champions of personal rights.” This leads us back to the Google case, and to the mixed popular
response that it has evoked.
The Global Times, a subsidiary of the Beijing-controlled People’s Daily, asked thousands of its readers
if they thought the Chinese government should submit to Google’s conditions. The survey reportedly
generated an overwhelmingly strong response to the effect that Beijing should stand up to
Google. [3] Over the weekend, I chatted with a newly arrived visiting new media scholar from a topranking university in China. She told me that the majority of her students consider it opportunistic for
Google to threaten to leave China just when a new round of Internet crackdowns is raising eyebrows
among Chinese netizens. Her students think that Google is exploiting anti-crackdown sentiment and
that its threat is mainly a gesture to please the U.S. government. Setting aside the Chinese students’
lack of nuanced understanding of how U.S. politics and commerce work, I find the students’ cynicism
less surprising than disappointing. Questioned about how her students and people around her react to
the hacking effort to spy on political activists, she was taken aback, asking whether there is evidence
to support this claim. Apparently there has been little discussion on the political aspect of the attack.
The mainstream Chinese media either downplays or omits entirely the part about the attempt at
obtaining information about the political activists.
Acknowledging that there had been vague coverage of this particular aspect of the Google protest on
China’s mainstream media, the Chinese visiting scholar probed, “Is there inside information that you
know that we don’t know?” I told her that there is nothing “inside” about it — the reports are out in
the open. I was keenly aware of the patronizing tone I took while trying to suggest to her what it
means to have a free flow of information. For that, I apologized. I then asked her about people’s
reactions to reports that the hacking might be linked to the Chinese state. She asked tersely, “Is there
any evidence?” She told me further that most of her students use local portals, so Google’s
threatened departure wouldn’t cause much inconvenience. Only a limited number of elites in China
routinely use Google, she said.
My conversation with the Chinese visiting scholar points to a missing link between Google and many
Internet users in China, which might have contributed to Google’s initial lukewarm grassroots
reception in China. But the tide seems to be turning in Google’s favor. As Google’s recent defiance has
made it headline news among the average Internet users in China, this has paradoxically made Google
more accessible and sympathetic among the Chinese public who had otherwise paid scant attention to
the technological giant and who were led to believe that Google was nothing more than an
imperialistic Western firm who desired to have a stake in China’s market. In other words, in turning
the issue of Google from a technological phenomenon into a social one, Google is now receiving much
wider attention than it ever had in China. Google is finally beginning to generate a large enough
critical mass.
It is instructive here to compare Google’s experience with the Avatar case. Pulling the 2-D version
of Avatar to make way for Confucius was not quite the overanxious political move that it has been
portrayed as in the West. Western news reports have suggested that the state
removed Avatar because it felt threatened by the film’s enormous popularity and some of its thematic
content. The fact of the matter is that it was unusual to begin with for a Hollywood blockbuster to get
a release window so close to the Chinese New Year holiday, which is normally reserved for major
domestic releases. So ending Avatar’s run about a week ahead of the holiday’s start was more or less

according to the usual practice. Nevertheless, the state’s action was so abrupt, and the film was so
popular, that audiences were considerably miffed. Miffed and moved to action, going online and on
social media sites in huge numbers to express their passion for the blue people of Pandora and against
poor Confucius. The response was quick, widespread and intense, transforming passive association —
audience membership — into active participation in a popular movement. Markets, too, joined the
campaign — many theaters simply ignored the government’s order to remove Avatar — and recently
the government responded by restoring Avatar to more screens. So, a catalyzing event turns an
audience into something more like a public, and the government takes some accommodating action.
There have been many, many more instances of passively associated networks of people online and
on social media turned into active publics over some passing event or concern, and more still of active
networking and public expression about the major issues of the day in China. I am sure you are all
familiar with another recent instance of an apparently successful popular movement organized and
carried out primarily online and in social media — the campaign against the Chinese government’s
plan to equip all new computers sold in China with a new Internet monitoring program called “Green
Dam.” The government backed away from its plan after the strong public response. Green Dam or
something like it may still come back — the current information crackdown makes that clear — but
what is equally clear is that public discourse and public opinion have become regular, increasingly
forceful features of state-society relations in China.
Here I must emphasize that the advent of development, mediatization and critical masses
actually goes a long way toward lessening the likelihood of a true mass rebellion or
revolution aimed at regime change. The critical mass dynamic, or the rise of public opinion
and state-society negotiation, constitutes a participatory outlet for public frustration, and it
divides people into interest groups. So critical masses are challenging in some ways, but
can also contribute to regime stability.
Now I want to comment on the differences between the Avatar and Google situations: first, that the
continuing lack of easy access to unfiltered information is certainly a factor in the lukewarm-to-cynical
reception of Google’s action among many Chinese people. But there are ways around the Chinese
firewall, and there are enough people actively working around it to assure that a constant stream of
unauthorized information flows through the networks of public discourse. It is also true, however, that
just like most Americans, most Chinese use the Internet and social media primarily for entertainment,
social networking and other mundane purposes. Given the vast array of what is available inside the
firewall, they do not feel especially deprived of information, and they normally do not have any great
reason to doubt the news reports of their own media or to go looking, for instance, for something
more about the Google story than the mainstream media tell them. Even a professor of new media at
an elite Chinese university does not regularly go looking for contrary or divergent information about
news events unless she has a particular interest or she trips across an unexpected lead. So it’s not
surprising that the politically targeted computer hacking, downplayed in mainstream Chinese news
reporting on Google, escaped widespread notice. To most people in China, the Google story is only
about differences over the state’s censorship policy. That is, of course, reason enough for many to
sympathize with Google’s position, and many do, only not as much as they might with all the details.
A second difference between the two cases is the way that Chinese nationalism has become part of
the Google discourse. In her speech regarding Internet freedom and U.S. policy in Washington on
January 21, Hillary Clinton reminded the audience of comments that President Barack Obama made on
Internet freedom during the webcast section of his November “town hall meeting” in Shanghai. As
Clinton said: “In response to a question that was sent in over the Internet, he [Obama] defended the
right of people to freely access information, and said that the more freely information flows, the
stronger societies become. He spoke about how access to information helps citizens to hold their
governments accountable, generates new ideas, and encourages creativity.”
Clinton and Obama both have been about as diplomatic as it is possible to be without simply ignoring
the whole affair. Indeed, American newspaper columnists and some congressional representatives
have urged the Obama administration to take a more aggressive stand. Despite the diplomatic
language, the Chinese government has seized on the Clinton and Obama speeches as evidence of a

U.S. government plot to use Google and the rhetoric of “free information flows” as cover for its real
goal of flooding China with American-sourced information and entertainment.
An article originally posted on the People’s Net, and which has received wide circulation in Chinese
mainstream media, cited the following comments from the CEO of a Chinese online gaming company:
The Internet is the best media for the “smart power” diplomatic strategy that the United States has
been promoting. The U.S owns Google, Facebook, Myspace, YouTube, Twitter and other international
resources that have widely spread and well accepted around the world. It also retains control of the
majority of Internet root servers, as well as the most cutting-edge Internet technologies. The former
can be referred to as its soft power in the cyberspace, while the latter becomes the hard power of its
hegemonic control of the global network. As a military R & D project by the U.S. Department of
Defense, the Internet to some extent serves the political, commercial and cultural interest of the U.S.
For example, if the U.S. takes a dislike to a country, it can make it disappear from the Internet world
by blocking the country’s suffix from the root servers. In the cyberspace, hegemony is no longer
based on the actual geographic boundaries, but on the border of information. Internet is nothing but a
reproduction of the Western “battleship and armament” 170 years ago. [4]
Framings like this can be quite effective. Nationalist sentiment runs high in China, fueled by pride in
China’s rising place in the world on the one hand, and by an abiding sense of China’s historical
humiliations at the hands of Western imperialist powers on the other. Chinese netizens are certainly
interested in free information flows, but they do not want to be lectured to by foreigners, particularly
American leaders. This makes it a good bet for the Chinese state to portray the battle as Google and
the U.S. government vs. China (meaning the Chinese people), on both moral and nationalistic
grounds.
Here is a quote that presents the issue of Internet freedom as a moral one: “Xia Hong, the PR man for
a company called China InfoHighway…offered us a view that … ‘A network that allows individuals to do
as they please, lets them go brazenly wherever they wish, is a hegemonistic network that harms the
rights of others.’” This sounds like twisted logic, at least to me, but in the context of an emotional
argument about the U.S. trying to dominate China by overwhelming it with weapons of mass
information, and about a history of humiliation, it can give “free information flows” a run for its
money.
And speaking of money, a final difference between the Avatar and Google cases that I want to address
is the economics of each. Media regulation in China is now a bargaining process in which the twin
forces of state control and commercial imperatives must negotiate with each other. And market
imperatives and the state’s ideological directives often work in unison, sharing a common interest in
cultivating a stable climate of favorable public opinion. Google made little progress in gaining financial
grounds in China precisely because it is up against the dual forces of politics and economy. As Zachary
Karabell notes in Time magazine, China is brimming with thriving homegrown web franchises: “These
companies have a distinct advantage over foreign competitors because their founders and senior
managers are part of the same elite class as the regulators who enforce the various and mostly
unwritten rules of censorship. They have offices in Beijing, and they lobby the Chinese government
through uncharted back channels and are in what amounts to a continuous dialogue about what is and
what is not acceptable.”
In other words, the Chinese state and local economic interests have worked in unison in dismissing
Google’s request for an open and uncensored Internet system. And here again, Karabell asserts that
“the narrative of China’s emergence and a burgeoning world of hungry entrepreneurs not willing to
play second fiddle to America as the back story for the Google imbroglio might ring true for many
Chinese.”
In the case of Avatar, the public triumphed in their resolve to keep Avatar on screen partly because
they had the backing of Chinese theater chains that wanted to maximize their profits from
screening Avatar. Confucius is expendable when the financial well-being of the cinema chains as part
of the Chinese film industry is at stake. [5] Google, however, does not have local partners analogues
to theater chains whose financial interest contributed to the victory of the Chinese Avatarfans.

Back to the unidentified user of Google’s uncensored site mentioned in Kynge’s article — the user
acknowledged that “There is no way that Google will get away with this. They will have to leave China
for sure.” Many China-watchers in the West too have subscribed to the surging wisdom that, in a
battle with the Chinese state, the Chinese way would always come out a winner. As Geremie Barmé
concludes in a recent article about the China affair: “As China gets stronger and more wired, it will still
be limited by intellectual narrowness and Sinocentric bias. Pluralism and the open-mindedness that
comes with it — the worldly curiosity of previous great powers and the idealism that often supports it
— simply are not present. More to the point, they are not about to be encouraged.”
As much as I appreciate Barme’s and others’ insights, I can not help asking, “Encouraged by whom,
the Chinese state and its party organ? How about a little more faith on the self-motivating Chinese
netizens?” In the case of Google, based on what I’ve gathered, the tide of public opinion expressed on
the Internet and in social media appears to be turning now in Google’s favor. It at least looks as if a
critical mass of public interest and opinion is building that will influence the ongoing negotiations
between Google and the Chinese state.
In an interview Han Han, the popular Chinese blogger, gave to the Chinese website Tudou.com, Han
speaks of the Google event in phrases that echo the legendary news anchor Edward R. Murrow’s
famous sign-off line as he bid his farewell, “Good night, and good luck.” The video posted on Tudou
was taken down, but a different site posted the transcript. I include here excerpts of Han’s interview in
English:
Of course I feel quite sorry about Google’s leave. From Facebook to Youtube, now it is Google, some
many excellent international websites have left us. I personally respect Google’s behavior and spirit,
and for me it is not important whether they are for commercial purpose or not as long as they can
benefit other people. … So I can only say I’m sorry that all kinds of good websites have left us. The
Chinese Internet has become the biggest regional network in the world. If so, let’s practice how to
climb up the firewall and other techniques. We all need to perfect the (climbing) skill. My young
friends and young media people, let’s speak up and have our voice heard. This is the trend of history
that cannot be stopped. Any effort to prevent this from happening will be scorned upon in the future….
So I say, goodbye and good luck. [6]
And, based on my anonymous sources, a certain segment of Chinese elites are wary of, if only on an
economic ground, the imminent danger of a market monopoly of a couple of big Chinese search
engines in the absence of Google. It seems that some consensus is emerging between the public
opinion and the opinions of the elite Chinese Internet think tanks on the necessity of keeping Google
in China.
Finally, some Chinese bloggers do broach the topic from a different end of the moral spectrum,
endorsing Google’s courage in standing up to the Chinese censor and condemning Google’s Chinese
counterpart, Baidu, for cozying up to the Chinese state at the expense of people’s rights to free
information and social justice. As Zhang Luqiang writes in his open web article “Google Too Heavy to
Bear”: “China’s social information system has been highly distorted under the strict control … though
Google is imperfect, it was the only company that didn’t completely lose its principle during China’s
recent Internet crackdown. … Chinese companies should have their own value and principles. The
Chinese Internet companies with no value or principle should be the targets of our condemnation.
Chinese Internet companies should learn from Google, and obtain their value and principle. … Baidu
not only worked with the Government on Internet censorship, but also helped their corporate
customers block out negative information. Any corporation with moral value can never compete with
it. Baidu’s dirty business of covering negative information for its customers was exposed after the
‘tainted baby formula tragedy that claimed the lives of many Chinese infants.'” [7]
All of which is making it difficult for the Chinese state to be nonchalant about Google’s departure, if it
ever departs. Last but not least, a Chinese student seeking a graduate degree in the U.S. told me
passionately that Google has a moral obligation to stay and “prepare itself for a long-term struggle
rather than giving up the Chinese market so quickly,” “If it truly sees its mission as to make
information available and accessible to people.” In a nutshell, dare I predict that neither China nor
Google can afford the absence of Google in China?!

Finally, I’d like to touch briefly a framework of “convergence” I am developing with my co-author for a
book on CCTV that might shed some light on the current situation.
Towards A Theory of Convergence upon “Lifestyle Choice” [8]
The convergence notion refers to a global trend, in intensively mediatized societies, toward what
might be called “informal participatory politics.” Now in both the established democracies and
the regime-sustaining politics of authoritarian states, government is perceived as less and
less able to deal effectively with citizens’ concerns, since it is constrained by the terms of
participation in an integrated global system to let market forces operate with minimal
interference. Furthermore, elections and elected officials in both democratic and
authoritarian states are increasingly beholden and responsive to moneyed interests and
expensive, image-driven media campaigns. As a result, we are witnessing a shift from
traditional civic life and political participation to a new age of “lifestyle politics” driven by
“values” articulated at the level of individual behavior and popular action in consumer
choices, online exchanges, demonstrations, and other informal forums.
As opposed to given, organic, primordial identities, a lifestyle is an active choice about
identity. The general historical movement has been away from given and secure identities
and meaning determined by parentage, religion, and work toward moral relativism and
meaning/identity unmoored, left increasingly to personal choice. Globalization accelerates
this existential shift, which is both liberating and frightening. You are freer to choose larger
parts of your own identity, but how exactly do you make that choice? How is one set of
values better or more “true” than another? This accounts for a great deal of modern
anxiety. In fact, when the new Pope came into office, almost his first words were a warning
that “relativism” is the chief threat to contemporary humanity.
The critical problem of existential anxiety about meaning, identity, and moral relativism is
common to both the West and China, and neither governments in the West nor China are
equipped to deal with the problem, which adds up to public cynicism about government and
traditional political action directed primarily toward government action. Thus, people have
taken it upon themselves to cope with new personal challenges for managing careers,
social relationships, and family life.
For instance, consider Whole Foods, the organic, gourmet food market started in Austin, TX
in the 1970s, which soon grew into a global chain appreciated by “foodies” and liberal,
earthy, holistic types everywhere. When founder and CEO John Mackey spoke out against
Obama’s healthcare reform effort in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece, saying, among other
things, that there is no right to healthcare in the Constitution. This was a shot to the heart
of Whole Foods’ main clientele, many of whom immediately decided to boycott,
demonstrate and demand Mackey’s resignation.
The example contains a couple of lifestyle political actions. First, many Whole Foods
customers have been shopping at the market for years as an expression of lifestyle choices
about supporting organic farming, natural products, fair trade practices and so on. They are
willing to pay a premium for something that they believe contributes to their own health
and to a healthy planet. That is an example specifically of “prosumerism,” or supporting
businesses and business practices that conform to various ideals. Now they feel betrayed,
and their choice not to shop at Whole Foods, to demonstrate outside stores (in New York,
among other places) or to go online and rant against Whole Foods, is another instance of
lifestyle activism.
Yet lifestyle politics is not just about consumption. The concept of lifestyle extends beyond
the pursuit of leisure and consumption practices to involve the expression of individual
rights and a consciousness about the social responsibilities associated with a given
lifestyle. It is about associating with a group or class of people in order to claim rights and
recognition against the insecurities of contemporary, globalized society. As W. Lance
Bennett, among others, has argued, the political and economic transformations and

consequent widespread personal anxiety and insecurity (job insecurity, decreasing real
wages, destabilized identities, cynicism about traditional politics) are the driving forces
behind the shift from traditional civic life and political participation to a new age of
“lifestyle politics.”
Thus, we suggest a developing point of convergence between China and the West in politics and
political participation. In the case of China, changes accrued from rapid development and its reengagement with the outside world have produced a quasi-public sphere that compels the state to
actively cultivate and incorporate public opinion into a more overtly deliberative policy making
process. Still autocratic in form, China’s polity has become more responsive in practice to a distinctly
media-driven civil society in which audiences emulate publics. Here it is very important to note that
popular public approval of the government is currently higher in China than almost anywhere else. At
least two recent studies (one by a group led by Andrew Nathan and another by the PEW Research
Center) find very high public support both for the form of government and for China’s current
“direction.” So China’s critical masses seem to be very far from thinking about regime change. They
are mainly concerned about their local pieces of the pie.
In a nutshell, authoritarian states that adapt and accommodate in anticipation of a
revolution might persist indefinitely. Elsewhere, though, the “color revolutions” are
examples of authoritarian governments substantially failing to keep up with development,
relying too much on suppression and too little on accommodation of modernizing publics. I
should emphasize that once frustrated publics actually succeed in forcing democratic
reform, they are as likely to support neo-authoritarians as liberal democrats (such as in
Ukraine and Russia), and will probably swing back and forth between the two, much like
how Americans have swung between Democrats and Republicans.
The Internet, obviously, has been vital to this new breed of identity politics. The Internet as a public
space affords a platform or voice to anyone with access to a computer or a cell phone. It is forceful
because of its inherent “brushfire” characteristics: information can catch fire and grow into full-blown
political movements in an instant, and it can be sustained in smoldering underground networks
indefinitely (it’s hard to put out). On the other hand, the quality of this super-charged public discourse
can become questionable. It is highly democratic in the sense of participatory access, but it is also rife
with problems. It is characteristically messy and frequently uncivil. It is highly vulnerable to
manipulation and deceit, and it is ripe with willful ignorance, misinformation, and misguided faith in
numbers and volume as proof of truth.
The Chinese nationalists drunk on Chinese exceptionalism and the Americans who are convinced that
they have the patent on democracy and human rights can beat each other over the head all day about
which side comes out the winner. The point is that they are using the same stick, with many of the
same attendant hazards. Ultimately, though, participatory politics demands a well-informed citizenry,
free speech, a vigorous exchange of ideas, and a free press as essential conditions, regardless of
cultural and historical differences between the East and the West. And well-informed Chinese masses
will benefit both Google and the Chinese state.
Ying Zhu is Professor of Media Culture at the City University of New York, College of Staten Island.
Notes
[1] See my books Chinese Cinema During the Era of Reform, the Ingenuity of the System (2003) and
a forthcoming book I co-edited with Stanley Rosen, Art, Politics and Commerce in Chinese
Cinema (2010).
[2] Indeed the Hu Jintao administration’s “Harmonious Society” platform is built upon some of the
Confucius principles. Detailed discussion see the last chapter of my book, Television in Post-Reform
China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market (2008).

[3] I should mention here the existence of the so-called “Fifty Cents Party,” a group of Chinese
Internet users who are paid by the state agencies to post whatever the state wants them to say. The
pay is 50 cents per message.
[4] My New York-based research assistant, Miss Yuan, translated the text from its Chinese original to
English for me.
[5] Here I wish to express my sympathy towards Hu Mei, the director ofConfucius, whose wellintended film is unfortunately caught in the firestorm ofAvatar. Hu is a personal friend, a thoughtful
director with a unique affinity to historical epics. I have fond memories of discussing Confucius (then a
project in development) with her in the summer of 2008.
[6] This text was also translated from Chinese to English by Miss Yuan.
[7] Earlier in the article, the author wrote that the cover-up of the tainted baby formula prolonged the
tragedy, and that it is a pity that the 1.3 billion Chinese people were forced to obtain information vital
to their health from the foreign media.
[8] Both the concept of “critical mass” and the theory of “convergence” receive substantial treatment
in my new book on CCTV.
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